One Programme — Protecting Critical Functions

From facility requirements to protection, autonomy and a justified configuration. A map of the full programme: from the overall architecture to integration, protected functions and technical documents.

Introduction — slides 01–03, overall closing slide — 152. Ranges include divider slides. The internal numbering of the sources has been preserved; overall navigation is provided by PDF bookmarks.

• I · W-FORTEX NEXT — Physical protection and survivability: independent perimeter, modular protective layers, localisation of consequences
• II · Integrated architecture — Selection and coordination of the required functions: detection and control, active / physical layers, response and recovery
• III · Shelters and CBRN — People and protected critical functions: life support, autonomous technical modules, specialised modes
• IV · IBIPC — Technologies and evidence base: products and structures, drawings and tests, limits of application

Facility-oriented configuration → pilot → integration verification. The programme concept is not certification. IBIPC evidence applies only to the relevant products and test conditions.

IW-FORTEX NEXT — Integrated Physical Protection and Survivability Platform

Not a single wall. Not a single net. One system. Each threat has its own protective layer. Critical infrastructure: energy · industry · transport · nuclear and radiological infrastructure.

• Perimeter — Independent supports; separation of impact
• Layers — Modularity; local protection
• Function — Consequences; recovery

• Independent physical perimeter — protection is built around the facility, not at the facility’s expense
• Protection that does not rely on the facility — the primary load path leads to foundations and anchors
• Protective layers — deflect · intercept · isolate the impact · suppress/localise · protect critical nodes · control consequences · restore the function
• We protect the function — power supply, cooling, control, monitoring, emergency systems, access, containment, fire response, communications

• W4X-WEB — a spatial interception perimeter
• Different layers — different functions — one independent structure
• Replaceability and repairability — damage the replaceable layer, preserve the critical facility
• Recovery sequence — inspect → isolate → replace → restore tension → return to service

• Reinforce where the value is greatest — a 1200×1200 mm suspended protective layer
• Alternative options — concrete slab, composite, UHPFRC, hybrid, NOVERA
• Lower protective belt LB-0…LB-9 — no belt, local screen, gabion, IBIPC/UHPFRC, composite, T/L hybrid
• Not a single wall — a matrix of engineering solutions

• Critical nodes — priority protection: transformer, control, emergency power, process equipment
• Local reinforcement — IBIPC, UHPFRC, concrete wall, composite, local screens
• An impact is not the end of the scenario — 12 autonomous modules (3 per side)
• A complete response package — fire suppression, spill containment, drainage, local isolation, rapid repair
• Surface — a separate technological layer — NOVERA and the facility envelope: an additional independent protective perimeter

From geometry to preliminary economics: HEXA-CUBE / HCU is a preliminary commercial-configuration benchmark. W-FORTEX NEXT: protect the facility, isolate the impact, control the consequences, restore the function. Modularity. Independence. Adaptability. Survivability.

U01 FLEXFRAME — folding steel carrier for lower-belt infill

A universal carrier replacing the heavy precast T-element. Technical document Rev D, 20.10.2026 — a preliminarily approved concept for further development, not manufacturing documentation.

The W-FORTEX lower protective belt needs a stabilising "T" element. Precast T/L elements are heavy (≈ 6.5 t each), expensive to transport and require a heavy crane. U01 FLEXFRAME takes over this role with a steel frame: two vertical posts, braces and a base; the infill is lowered from above between the jaws.

• Infill by threat and site — IBIPC 200 mm, local RC 300 mm (DBN) or a 500 mm gabion cassette
• No foundations — the belt stands on ballast or on anchors; only the upper-belt columns need foundations
• One post for 200–500 mm infill — the inner part slides on a carriage up to +300 mm in 50 mm steps
• Reusable — the post dismantles into flat parts with no oversize load; the infill is replaced without replacing steel
• In the configurator library — WF-LB-U01 (A anchored / B ballasted), WF-LB-U01-BP profile, WF-LB-U01-C corner column, WF-LB-U01-FC foundation column, assembly WF-LB-HU01

Three infill types in one frame

Comparison with the precast L-30 element

Reference offer: L-30 wall element, 2000 × 1000 × 3650 mm (DBN V.2.2-5:2023, 100 kPa). 100 kPa is a DBN blast-wave resistance class for protective structures, not a ballistic or anti-fragmentation class; it cannot be compared directly with STANAG.

Next steps: structural analysis of the post and steel optimisation (target ≤ 600 kg/m), confirmation of the IBIPC 3000 × 1000 × 200 panel, local RC panel to DBN, cell prototype (2 × U01 + 3 infills) and tests, WF-LB-U01-* library cards and GLB models for the configurator.

Rev D is a preliminarily approved concept for further development. It does not claim load-bearing capacity, ballistic or blast resistance and does not replace manufacturing documentation or tests.

Download the U01 FLEXFRAME Rev D technical document (PDF, CZ) ↓

One Platform — Different Industries

Energy, industry, oil and gas, transport, civil critical infrastructure, nuclear facilities, radiological facilities. The architecture adapts to the function and geometry of the facility.

• Substations, generation — combine layers according to the criticality of the node
• Refineries, tank farms — process zones, fire and spills change the architecture
• Gas infrastructure, chemical production — nodes of differing criticality require different layer combinations
• Battery systems — also among the nodes for which protective layers are combined

• W4X-NRS — integration of physical protection with nuclear and radiological safety
• Critical functions — not coordinates on a photo: power / cooling / control / monitoring; access / emergency systems; radiation monitoring / material areas
• Limit — W-FORTEX does not change the nuclear safety justification
• Not nuclear qualification — safety justifications, qualification, regulatory procedures and operator approval are required

IIIntegrated Protection Architecture

A modular concept for critical infrastructure. From function selection to qualified integration. One platform. Many technologies. Its own configuration: physical core + active layers + robotic recovery. The physical core is supplemented with exactly those functions that a specific facility needs.

A–J: a library of functional layers, not a mandatory kit. Conceptual architecture. The composition, interfaces and readiness are defined for each specific facility. The facility and its critical functions determine which layers to connect.

• System resilience must not depend on a single technology — active layers and the passive physical core work together
• Active layers — Detection → identification → C2; Electronic response → interception → robotics
• Passive physical core — WEB / mesh / panels / Lower Belt; IBIPC / Local Protection
• Passive fallback — if Radar / RF / network / C2 and active interception fail, the physical barrier remains without active detection; Fire — a separate readiness check
• Limit — barriers do not guarantee universal threat stopping; Fire Suppression is available only when readiness and resources are ensured

• Not a single sensor. Not a single point of failure — detection → correlation → confirmation → selected response
• Radar, RF, EO / IR, Acoustic, Ground — air tracks; radio signatures; optical and thermal verification; acoustic signs; perimeter / seismic / vibration
• Correlated threat — track + confidence + operator confirmation; C2: priority → coordination → selected response
• Data quality checks and alternative channels — fusion does not eliminate common-cause failures: power, networks and synchronisation are verified separately
• C2: coordinate, do not lock in — common operating picture + an open integration contract (sensors → C2 / fusion → response)
• Replacement without breaking the architecture — RADAR A → RADAR B: the function is preserved, the interface is supported, the supplier is approved, the requirements are confirmed

• Electronic counter-UAS — early effect only in an authorised configuration
• Three steps — 01 / Detection (multi-sensor signatures); 02 / C2 / decision (classification and permissions); 03 / Electronic response (approved RF / directional means)
• If the threat continues to move — the physical W-FORTEX core: WEB → suspended protection → local hardening → secondary-effect control
• Limit — the electronic layer does not replace the physical barrier and has no universal effectiveness; frequencies, permits, EMC and safety are determined by authorised specialists

• FPV / UAV: one continuous chain — early response → physical fallback → secondary effects → recovery
• 01 Detection — UAV / FPV
• 02 Confirmation — Multi-sensor
• 03 C2 — Decision
• 04 Response — Electronic / interception
• 05 WEB / panels — if the threat persists
• 06 Local / Fire — barrier and secondary effects
• 07 Robotic inspection — hazard and damage assessment
• 08 Recovery — module replacement / repair

• Robotics: inspection before a person enters — air and ground platforms support hazard assessment and recovery
• No one enters first without a hazard assessment — remote inspection → decision by the responsible specialist
• Air robotics — reconnaissance / interceptor / counter-FPV
• Ground robotics / GRS — patrol / inspection / mobile sensors / observation; emergency response / radiation reconnaissance
• After an attack — inspection and assessment → modular repair
• Limit — the photo is an example of the UGV class, not a supplier selection and not confirmed integration of PackBot into W-FORTEX

• Multi-layer protection around the facility — not default geometry, but an engineering choice for specific critical zones
• Perimeter — WEB / structural net; catch mesh / panels; stand-off / supports; cables / anchors
• Lower Belt — IBIPC / Gabion–Fill / Hybrid T/L / T–Gabion
• Local — openings, glazing, shielding; NOVERA; Fire — a separate functional circuit
• Limit — a conceptual spatial diagram, not a calculated structure: geometry, supports, anchors, tension and clearances require design

Configurator → Simulator

The physical + active + digital system uses a single configuration. First — the digital configuration. Then — the physical implementation. A target workflow per the brief, not a demonstration of working software. HCU is a brief term; prices and effectiveness are not calculated here.

• 01 / Configurator — target capabilities — object / zones / threat profile; example: Energy Substation · Option B
• Functions to select — Radar, RF, EO / IR, Acoustic, Counter-UAS, Interceptor, UGV / GRS, Inspection, C2
• Workflow — Required functions → recommendation → manual change → 3D / HCU → mass / logistics / price

• 02 / Simulator — the same Option B
• UAV approach → radar detection
• EO confirmation → C2 / Counter-UAS
• WEB interception → Fire / suppression
• GRS inspection → damage assessment
• Recovery → system restoration
• Rule — scenario input = selected configuration

• Threat — UAV / FPV
• Critical functions — power supply
• Geometry — zones and dimensions
• Regulation — permits / EMC
• Budget — priorities
• Operation — access / service
• Example — Energy substation: EO/IR + RF detection (radar — optional); C2 + Counter-UAS* coordination; physical core: WEB / panels, Lower / Local / Fire

We integrate rather than reinvent everything. Best available technologies: Radar / EO–IR / Counter-UAS, Robotics / Fire Systems, W-FORTEX Physical Core / IBIPC. Vendor independence. Replaceable subsystems. Qualified suppliers. One architecture — replaceable subsystems.

A list of technology classes does not mean that unnamed products have already been verified or integrated. Status is confirmed by evidence. Next step: facility analysis → requirements → technology selection → interface verification → pilot configuration.

IIIShelters and CBRN Resilience

Continuity requires a protected environment for people and technical functions. Not a single bunker. A platform for different missions: people · critical functions · autonomy · continuity. Conceptual CGI visualisation · not a working drawing.

A scalable family of shelters — from a compact module to a large protected complex (COMPACT SHELTER · MODULAR SHELTER · PROTECTED FACILITY). A presentation scale, not certified product classes. Actual capacity and autonomy are determined by the project.

• A modular protected structure — the material and the systems’ composition are chosen for the mission, not the other way round
• Input requirements — mission and capacity; autonomy; threat profile; CBRN requirements; site conditions; energy needs
• Selected modules — a configuration for a specific facility: structure, air / CBRN, energy, water, sanitation, medical, command, communications, technical
• W-FORTEX Facility — a protected environment for people and functions; project-specific

• Material by mission — conventional / monolithic / precast reinforced concrete · high-performance concrete
• Options — IBIPC / UHPFRC · steel · composite · hybrid systems
• Execution — above ground · earth-bermed · partially or fully buried
• Priorities are shown, not a rigid kit — functions can be combined; all characteristics are determined by the project

Life support and autonomy — systems integration, not just the structure. Air: outside → protected intake → filtration → people. Energy: grid / UPS / reserve → protected bus → life support. Capacity, autonomy and system parameters — project-specific engineering.

CBRN Configuration and Protected Resilience

CBRN — a configuration for a specific risk. One standard system does not cover all scenarios. The set of means, operating modes and acceptance criteria — TBC / project-specific engineering.

• 01 / Detection — CBRN / hazardous monitoring; radiation monitoring; dosimetry · alarm
• 02 / Contamination control — protected intake · filtration; airlock vestibule · zoning; decontamination interface
• 03 / Support for people — water · energy · communications; controlled air environment; emergency modes

Contamination control ≠ shielding against external ionising radiation.

• Nuclear and radiological integration — a protected environment to support critical safety functions
• Emergency personnel — specialised personnel; protected technical rooms; emergency management; controlled access
• Functions — power (emergency power), cooling (cooling interfaces), control (protected control), monitoring (radiation · dosimetry), communication (emergency communications), access (zone / access control), emergency response (response support)
• Limit — integration into the facility’s safety case; not automatic nuclear qualification or certification of W-FORTEX

• Ventilation and filtration — a critical subsystem: integrated control of air and isolation modes
• Chain — external environment → protected intake → filtration → controlled environment → personnel
• Control — monitoring → mode control → alarm → personnel actions
• Modes and redundancy — emergency ventilation · redundancy; pressure control — where required
• Isolation and exhaust — controlled air removal; control of contamination crossflow
• Limit — generator: separate design of combustion and exhaust; filter classes, flow rate and pressure — TBC / project-specific

• Radon and the underground environment — burial requires not only structural protection but also environment control
• 01 / Envelope — barrier · sealing of joints and penetrations
• 02 / Monitoring — radon and humidity measurement
• 03 / Air exchange — ventilation · modes as required
• 04 / Base and water — sub-slab measures — as needed; drainage · groundwater protection
• Limit — the effectiveness of measures is confirmed by measurements; compatibility with CBRN isolation is determined by specialists

• Suitability for long-term occupancy — preserve not only life, but also support people’s ability to work
• Logic — duration of stay → resources → space → operating modes
• Limit — capacity, occupancy conditions and autonomy time — per calculation for the specific facility
• Protected energy and decentralisation — we protect not only people, we protect the facility’s function
• A centralised node — a concentration of dependencies; instead, modules: A / Generation (backup generation · cogeneration / micro-CHP), B / Storage (batteries · UPS · protected distribution), C / Control (control · communications · technical reserves)
• Critical functions — life support; pumps · water; control · communications
• Limit — redundancy and autonomy per scenarios and calculation; combustion / exhaust paths are separate from ventilation for people

• Scientific and technical cooperation — for complex facilities, a protective structure is an integrated engineering system
• Facility requirements — operator · safety case; mission · risks
• W-FORTEX Engineering — architecture; systems integration
• Specialised institutions — industry institutes; scientific expertise
• CBRN / Nuclear experts — radiation safety; physical protection
• System suppliers — air · energy; monitoring · communications
• Limit — a model of the required involvement of competencies; specific partners, contracts and roles are agreed for the project

Protect people. Preserve functions. Ensure autonomy. Support operational continuity. Pilot: mission → requirements → experts → configuration.

IVIBIPC — Technical Annex

From concept to specific products and verifiable source data. UHPFRC technology, modular protective elements, drawings, tests and primary documents. IBIPC is one of the material directions of W-FORTEX, not a mandatory basis for all solutions.

• IBIPC in the W-FORTEX architecture — one of the high-performance technologies, not the only material in the system
• Place in the architecture — W-FORTEX (modular protection architecture) → Lower Protective Belt, Local Hardening, IBIPC / UHPFRC (high-performance concrete elements)
• Selection criteria — criticality · required protection level · available footprint · transport and installation · verified configuration
• Limit — a conceptual integration of W-FORTEX per the customer’s brief; not a test result

• IBIPC: technology profile — Institute of Blast & Impact Proof Concrete; the name IBIPC is retained as a technology designation within W-FORTEX
• Material — UHPFRC (Ultra High Performance Fiber Reinforced Concrete): ultra-high-performance fibre-reinforced concrete
• Development — the catalogue links the development to the Czech Technical University in Prague, the University of Defence and the Military Research Institute
• Ministry of Defence — the letter cites research cooperation and contractual interaction

• CTU Prague — the elements were developed jointly with CTU Prague, the University of Defence and the Military Research Institute; protected by international patent rights
• University of Defence / VVÚ — Faculty of Military Technology; Military Research Institute: final tests, reports, certification
• Intellectual property — Patent CVUT Prague No. 304 478; European Patent EP 3 351 518 A1 (numbers from the certificate, p. 40)
• Limit — the descriptions of roles and supplies are Product File statements, not an independent registry check

Why high-performance concrete — engineering logic, not unconfirmed numerical advantages. The Product File contains no comparative percentages or universal reductions in cost, mass or thickness.

The catalogue’s numbering and names have been preserved, including repetitions. The catalogue claims 30 products but repeats numbers 10 and 20. For some items, individual characteristics are not provided.

• Universal segments I / II — geometry, mass and a sealed locking joint with a rubber gasket; system material: UHPFRC; values per the catalogue, the drawing is not a scale template
• Where justified in the lower belt — zones with a limited footprint; high criticality and a high required level of protection; local areas where thickness and transport mass determine the layout
• What to combine with — Local RC; Gabion / Fill; Hybrid T/L; Hybrid T/Gabion; Steel; UHMWPE; Composite; Suspended Panels
• Local hardening — emergency and backup power; control, communications and monitoring; high-priority cable routes; local critical equipment zones
• Integration conditions — do not block ventilation, heat dissipation and emergency access; verify joints, openings, supports and foundation; do not transfer sample classes to a node without confirmation

• Hybrid Wall — high-performance local fill / screen; compatibility with steel, RC, gabions and supports is verified separately
• T-Wall — a protective module or a local section of the belt; stability, base, joints, transport, installation
• Local shielding — a priority screen around a critical node; impact scenario, stand-off, openings, secondary effects
• Energy and industry — generators and cogeneration units; transformer and power nodes; power cables, optical fibre and IT / IoT; control points and backup systems
• Nuclear and radiological infrastructure — potential application within the W-FORTEX architecture; no automatic nuclear qualification is claimed; a separate safety justification, qualification and operator approval are required
• Logistics and economics — the cost of the material is assessed together with the full configuration: material + fabrication + delivery + crane + base + joints + installation, operation, repair, replacement and access to critical equipment
• Limit — the annex contains no invented percentages, costs, reductions in trips or universal savings

Technology. Modularity. A verified configuration. IBIPC is a high-performance option within W-FORTEX. Real drawings and results. Preserved documents. Open limits of evidence.

Material: Indicators Are Not Mixed

Catalogue parameters, concrete class and measured results are separate records. The supplied file contains no numerical data on flexural strength or mix composition. No assumed values have been added.

Mean values — as printed in the report. The density of 2765 ± 64 does not agree with the simple mean of the rows; clarification is required.

• Laboratory report — Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Civil Engineering · Testing Laboratory 1048; Expert laboratory OL 133
• Accreditation — CIA · ČSN EN ISO/IEC 17025:2018
• Subject / date — Compressive strength of test specimens 133/3 · 17th December 2021
• Scope — sheets 1 and 3 are available; sheet 2 is missing; this is an available extract, not the full report
• Uncertainty — expanded uncertainty U: k = 2, confidence level approximately 95 %
• Limit — the results apply only to the specimens tested

• Concrete mixes: repair and production — rapid repair of damaged facilities important for national defence and critical infrastructure
• Claimed in the catalogue — high compressive strength of over 165 MPa, durability and dimensional stability
• Limit — over 165 MPa is a catalogue value; it does not replace the laboratory test table of another specimen

• Finishing and camouflage — the surface of the elements is treated with UNIVERSUM CAMOUFLAGE PATTREN primer; on request — eight other camouflage colours
• Catalogue reference — NATO MERDEC; the PATTREN / MERDEC designations are preserved as printed
• Colours — summer green · winter green · snow with trees · snow with open ground · tropical green · Rerd desert · grey desert · winter Arctic

STANAG / NATO: Evidence, Limits and a Map of Primary Records

Each statement is tied to a specific document. The W-FORTEX concept is not nuclear qualification and not a new test result; NATO supplier status does not mean certification of every product.

Ballistic protection: the source does not provide a universal ballistic test distance or all the setup details for every product.

Blast and fragments are different configurations. The supplied Product File contains no numerical overpressure values in kPa for these tests.

STANAG 2280 Ed. 2 / ATP-3.12.1.8: levels 1–6 — the full classification from the catalogue, not the IBIPC certification range. The ASM / Automac canon names and ambiguous translations are preserved per the source. The ATP covers impact on infrastructure: blast; penetration; fragmentation; secondary effects, including spalling and fire.

• Letter from the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic — No. 490537/2024-1216 · 17th June 2024; INSTITUTE OF BLAST & IMPACT PROOF CONCRETE, s.r.o. — a contractual partner of the Ministry of Defence
• Classes in the letter — testing and certification by the Military Research Institute under NATO STANAG 2280:2016 Ed. 2; the letter itself states classes A5, D4, D6
• Identifiers — NCAGE 8286G; NSN 5411160090335; 13-digit NATO STOCK NUMBER
• Claims of the letter — drone attacks; infantry weapons fire up to 14.5 mm; artillery rounds up to 155 mm; explosions near objects up to 50 kg TNT; grenades
• Limit — these are statements of the letter, not full reports for every scenario; a recommendation and NATO supplier status are not blanket product certification

• Claimed in the Product File — high compressive strength of 150 MPa and tensile strength of 15 MPa, classes A5, C4, D6, zero radio-wave transmission, a very high level of infrared shielding and extremely high nuclear shielding properties
• What the file does not establish — attenuation coefficients, spectrum, thickness for a given dose, test regime or nuclear qualification are not provided
• A5 / C4 / D6 — are not radiation protection classes
• RF / IR / gamma / neutron shielding — requires a separate justification for the specific configuration
• Catalogue claims regarding WMD / nuclear explosion — are not automatic nuclear qualification
• VVÚ certificate 2280-011-2022 — Classification A5 / C4 / D6; STANAG 2280 Edition 2 / ATP-3.12.1.8 Edition 1 Version 1; Conditionally Compliant
• VVÚ certificate 2280-001-2025 — Classification E3; Report SMI/66/2019-VVU; Conditionally Compliant; Concrete panel and Small Metal Roadblock (Police Type) — ambiguity preserved